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CODIFICATION OF THE
LEX MERCATORIA: FRIEND OR FOE?
Vanessa M. Johnson*
I. INTRODUCTION
HE lex mercatoria (meaning "law merchant" in Latin)' dates back
to the 11th century, originating as customary mercantile law to re-
solve cross-border trade disputes between merchants.2 It was de-
veloped and applied in Western Europe for almost 800 years, generally by
"special quasi-judicial courts" that decided cases based on "the customs
and practices of merchants"; 3 feudal and Roman law present during this
time was inadequate in governing these types of merchant transactions. 4
As states and national law began to arise during medieval times, the lex
mercatoria fell into disuse in favor of domestic state law. 5 But in the
1960s it was revived 6 as "an informal and flexible net of rules" to be pri-
marily applied by arbitrators, and was referred to as the "new lex mer-
catoria."' 7 From the latter part of the 20th century to the present day,8 the
lex mercatoria has arguably transitioned into another era-the "new lex
mercatoria"-which is signified by a move "from an amorphous and flexi-
ble soft law to an established system of law with codified legal rules...
and strongly institutionalized court-like international arbitration." 9
What actually constitutes the substance of the lex mercatoria has been
*Vanessa M. Johnson earned her B.A. and J.D. at the University of British
Columbia.
1. Adaora Okwor, Lex Mercatoria as Transnational Commercial Law: is the Lex Mer-
catoria Preferentially for the 'Mercatocracy'?, in THiORY AND) PRACrJlIcE OF
HARMONISATION 393, 394 (Mads Andenas & Camilla Baasch Andersen eds.,
2011).
2. Lawrence L. Herman, The New Multilateralism: The Shift to Private Global Regu-
lation, COMMENiTARY No. 360 TRADE AND Ii PoL'y, 5-6 (2012).
3. Okwor, supra note 1, at 395-96.
4. Id.
5. See Herman, supra note 2, at 6; Okwor, supra note 1, at 396. See also Harold J.
Berman & Felix J. Dasser, The "New" Law Merchant and the "Old": Sources, Con-
tent, and Legitimacy, in LE'x MERCATORIA AND ABrIRATION 21, 22 (Thomas E.
Carbonneau, ed., 1990).
6. Okwor, supra note 1, at 396.
7. Ralf Michaels, The True Lex Mercatoria: Law Beyond the State, 14 IND. J. G[,OBAl
LEGAL S-ruI). 447, 448 (2007). See also L. Yves Fortier, The New, New Lex Mer-
catoria, or, Back to the Future, 17 ARB. Ir'i 121, 121 (2001).
8. The creation of the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UN-
DROIT) Principles (see infra note 13) in the 1990s is viewed as a signifying factor
of the new lex mercatoria. See Michaels, supra note 7, at 448; Fortier, supra note 7,
at 124-25.
9. Michaels, supra note 7, at 448.
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extensively debated.10 An assessment of what seems to encompass most
current commentators' conception of lex mercatoria is explained by
Moses: "The lex mercatoria is not based on any one legal system, but
incorporates international commercial rules, general principles of law,
standards, and trade usages."' "I Yet there is still disagreement over this
point; the "purist" view of the lex mercatoria only includes rules derived
specifically from "mercantile behavior."' 12
While an extensive paper could likely be written on the different at-
tempts to define the lex mercatoria, this paper endeavours to take a prag-
matic approach based on the current status of the lex mercatoria and
issues surrounding its development. As such, this article will review key
aspects of legal theory relating to how the lex mercatoria may fit into a
legal order, and examine debates surrounding codification of the lex mer-
catoria, giving particular attention to the International Institute for the
Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) Principles 13 and the Center for
Transnational Law's (CENTRAL) Trans-Lex Principles.1 4 These two
codifications illustrate the current state of and approach to the develop-
ment and preservation of the lex mercatoria. This article argues that a
cautious approach to codification should be taken to ensure that the
"friend" codification that has become the lex mercatoria by providing it
with recognition and legitimacy as "law" does not become its "foe" by
threatening the autonomy of merchants or the future development of the
substantive lex mercatoria.
The order of topics of this article is as follows: Part II reviews and dis-
cusses theories of the lex mercatoria, with an overview of traditional theo-
ries and a more in-depth discussion of modern theories relating to the lex
mercatoria's role in a legal order; Part III provides an examination of the
issues raised by codification of the lex mercatoria, including its appear-
ance as state-like law, its vulnerability to politicization, and the impact of
codification on its development; and Part IV suggests an approach to the
lex mercatoria proceeding into the future.
10. See MARGARET L. Mosi-s, TiHE PRINCIPLILS AND PRACICE OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARnRATION 64-66 (2d ed. 2012).
11. Id. at 65. See also Ole Lando, The Lex Mercatoria in International Commercial
Arbitration, 34 INT'L & COMiE. L.Q. 747, 749-50 (1985); Celia Wasserstein Fass-
berg, Lex Mercatoria - Hoist with Its Own Petard?, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 67, 71
(2004).
12. Fassberg, supra note 11, at 71.
13. See International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, UNIDROIT, http://
www.UNIDROIT.org (last visited Apr. 2, 2014); UNIDROIT Principles of Inter-
national Commercial Contract 2010, UNIDROIT, http://www.unidroit.org/english/
principles/contracts/principles20l0/integralversionprinciples2010-e.pdf (last visited
May 2011) [hereinafter UNIDROIT Principles].
14. Trans-Lex Principles, TRANs-LEx, http://www.trans-lex.org/principles (last visited
October 21, 2014).
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II. THEORIES OF THE LEX MERCATORIA
A. TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF THE LEX MERCATORIA
The initial discourse on the modern revival of the lex mercatoria (the
new lex mercatoria) was primarily focused on whether or not the lex mer-
catoria constituted law. 15 Scholars such as Goldman argued that indeed it
did (or that it was coming into being), 16 while Mustill did not view lex
mercatoria as law, but merely as a set of unpredictable principles.' 7 Mus-
till compiled a list of twenty principles that he determined constituted the
lex mercatoria, arguing that they were evidence that the lex mercatoria
was insufficient to constitute law. 18 Ironically, Goldman and other pro-
ponents of the lex mercatoria used this same list of principles as evidence
for the existence of lex mercatoria as law, noting that the list's contents
addressed almost every issue "raised in disputes relating to international
economic relations."' 19 Like Mustill, Mann also could not conceive of the
lex mercatoria as law because it was not connected to a national legal
order.20 Mann referred to the lex mercatoria as an excuse for arbitrators
to use "palm tree justice"21 and that it was "no more than 'a fig leaf to
hide an unauthorized substitution of [the arbitrators'] own private norma-
tive preferences for . . . the properly applicable law."22 Lowenfeld, on
the other hand, argued that lex mercatoria warranted legal legitimacy
only as an interpretive tool in the context of international commerce to
interpret the national source as consistent "with generally accepted inter-
national understanding and usage. ' '23
15. See Michaels, supra note 7, at 449; Ulla Liukkunen, Lex Mercatoria in International
Arbitration, in NORMATIVE PLURALISM AND INTERNATIONAl LAW: EXPLORING
GLOAi. GOViRNANCiL 201, 205-06 (Jan Klabbers & Touko Piiparinen, eds. 2013).
16. Berthold Goldman, Introduction, in L~x MIRCATORIA AN) ARBITIATION, XV, XV
(Thomas E. Carbonneau, ed., 1990). See also BIERTIIOLD GOLDMAN, LFx MER-
CATORIA 7 (1983); see Clive M. Schmitthoff, Nature and Evolution of the Transna-
tional Law of Commercial Transactions, in TiI TRANSNATIONAi LAW oF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CON'IRACIS 19, 20 (Norbert Horn & Clive M.
Schmitthoff, eds. 1982); Guenther Teubner, 'Global Bukowina': Legal Pluralism in
the World Society, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3, 9 (Gunther Teubner, ed.
1997); Liukkunen, supra note 15, at 205.
17. See The Rt. Hon. Lord Justice Mustill, The New Lex Mercatoria: The First Twenty-
five Years, in LIUBER AMICORUM FOR LORI WILBI-1RFORCIE 149, 180 - 82 (Maarten
Bos & Ian Brownlie, eds. 1987) 149. See also Keith Highet, The Enigma of the Lex
Mercatoria, in LIx MERCT'rORIA ANI) ARBITRATION 99, 100, 104 - 05 (Thomas E.
Carbonneau, ed., 1990) (in agreement with Mustill).
18. Mustill, supra note 17, at 177-81.
19. Goldman, supra note 16, at xvi; See also Michaels, supra note 7, at 449.
20. F. A. Mann, Introduction, in LEX MI RCATORIA AN) ARBITRATION xix, xix-xxi
(Thomas E. Carbonneau, ed., 1990); see also Teubner, supra note 16, at 10.
21. Mann, supra note 20, at xx.
22. Id. at xxi (quoting Professor Park).
23. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Lex Mercatoria: An Arbitrator's View, in LEX MEtR-
CATORIA ANI) ARBITRATION 37, 53 (Thomas E. Carbonneau, ed., 1990).
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B. RECENT THEORIES OF THE LEX MERCATORIA
Since the late 1990s, legal theory surrounding the lex mercatoria has
evolved to a new level that better addresses the current, generally ac-
cepted reality that it is some form of law. Although the debate over the
lex mercatoria appears far from being resolved, the utility of the legality
debate is clear; the acceptance of the lex mercatoria as law was necessary
to give it some legitimacy in modern commercial practice (as exemplified
by the creation of codifications such as those previously mentioned).
This, in turn, has facilitated the development of theoretical frameworks
that attempt to conceptualize the lex mercatoria as law in relation to cur-
rent legal systems. This is the current and necessary debate surrounding
the theories discussed below; as Berger puts it, "[t]he question is no
longer 'lex mercatoria: yes or no?' but rather 'lex mercatoria: when and
how'?' '2 4 Until the answer to this question is determined, whether or not
the lex mercatoria constitutes law is irrelevant. This is because for the lex
mercatoria to attain true legitimacy and function as law, it needs to find its
place in relation to already existing legal systems.
1. The Lex Mercatoria as Global Law
Teubner presents the lex mercatoria as having the capacity to be global
legal order that is not rooted in state law-it is "without a state. ' 25 His
theory provides a much more stable basis for the autonomous lex mer-
catoria in the current climate of a codified lex mercatoria and highly de-
veloped international arbitration than the customary law approach
previously taken by Goldman. 26 Teubner's theory creates an entire ana-
tional legal system that parallels state legal systems, yet is completely de-
rived from contract. His approach may be perceived as creating a more
legitimate basis for the lex mercatoria because it creates a structure with
functional similarities to state law-an already generally accepted form of
legal system.
Teubner's approach is thought to be an important development of the
contrat sans loi construct 27 (meaning self-regulatory contracts without ba-
ses in national or international law), despite the fact that he has criticized
the concept as irreconcilable with "the traditional doctrine of legal
sources." 28 Teubner finds a way around the "source problem" and is able
to reconcile the idea of a global law without a state with traditional legal
sources. He sees an entire legal order manifested by the international
commercial contract.2
9
24. KLAUS PETER BERGER, THE CREI-PING CODI1CATION OF -1E NiEw Lux MER-
CATORIA 287 (2d ed. 2010).
25. Teubner, supra note 16, at 3.
26. Goldman, supra note 16, at xviii, 3.
27. Michaels, supra note 7, at 449-50.
28. Teubner, supra note 16, at 9.
29. Id. at 16.
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Teubner offers a view of lex mercatoria in the context of global con-
tracts without the need for domestic or international law to provide a
basis for its use. Instead, he argues that the paradox of the self-validating
contract underlies the creation of a global economic law (including a
global conception of the lex mercatoria). This paradox is illustrated in the
case of the lex mercatoria, whereby the process of contracting across na-
tional boundaries converts the contract from national to global;30 yet, be-
cause these contracts claim transnational validity and are not associated
with a particular state, they are, in effect, cut off from not only a national
legal order, but also any legal order. 31 As there is no legal order to vali-
date the existence of the contract (as there would be in a national con-
text), the contract must validate itself. This self-validation, however,
leads to a paradox of self-reference because there is no referential base or
anchor of "non-contractual premises. ' 32 This self-referencing paradox
can be seen as a "contractual version of the Cretan liar paradox, '33 where
"the positive version ('We agree that our agreement is valid').., is a pure
tautology" and "the negative version ('We agree that our agreement is
not valid') ... leads to nothing but endless oscillation" between "valid"
and "not-valid." 34
While this paradox may seem to be an insurmountable problem-or
perhaps one that is too wrapped up in philosophy to be seen as having
practical relevance to transnational commercial contracting and the lex
mercatoria-being able to recognize that it sheds light on the discomfort
with the lex mercatoria. It illustrates why the lex mercatoria is seen to
lack solid roots in a legal order, but its recognition also provides hope for
the notion that the lex mercatoria may be able to obtain the much-needed
legitimacy to be confidently relied upon in transnational commercial
contracts.
Teubner, however, does not propose to resolve this paradox, but argues
that it can be concealed in such a way that it appears to no longer exist.35
He identifies three ways that global contracts can appear to be "de-
paradoxified": (1) hierarchy, (2) time, and (3) externalization. These
three aspects of the global contract together enable the lex mercatoria to
"create its own legal centre."' 36 He describes the "most perfect 'de-
paradoxification"' as a "self-regulatory contract which goes far beyond
one particular commercial transaction and establishes a whole private le-
gal order with a claim to global validity," including "clauses that refer
conflicts to an arbitration 'court' which is identical with the private insti-
30. Id. at 15.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. For a more detailed explanation of the Cretan liar paradox, see J. C. Beall &
Michael Glanzberg, Liar Paradox, in Tin,. SrANvORc ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSO-
miy' (Edward N. Zalta, ed. 2013), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ fa112013/en
tries/liar-paradox.
34. Teubner, supra note 16, at 15.
35. Id. at 16.
36. Id.
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tution that was responsible for 'legislating' the model contract. '37 This is
called a "closed circuit." 38
Using this model, the three ways of de-paradoxification listed above
are manifested as follows: (1) The contract creates an "internal hierar-
chy" by containing both "primary rules" that "regulate the future beha-
viour of the parties," and "secondary rules" that "regulate the recognition
of primary rules" by "identification," "interpretation, and the procedures
for resolving conflicts."' 39 (2) The contract "temporalize[s] the paradox"
by referring to both the past and the future through the recognition of a
"pre-existing standardization of rules" and a "future of conflict regula-
tion."40 (3) The contract "externalizes the fatal self-validation . . . by re-
ferring conditions of validity to external 'non-contractual' institutions"
(i.e., arbitration houses), "which are nevertheless 'contractual', since they
are a sheer internal product of the contract itself."'' a This element thus
transforms the "circle of contractual self-validation" into "two legal
processes-contracting and arbitration. '42 Another externalization in
addition to arbitration, which fills the quasi-court-like role, "is the refer-
ence to quasi-legislative institutions. '4 3 Teubner cites organizations such
as the International Law Association in London and the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in Paris as such quasi-legislative
institutions.44
Externalization is also key because it creates a distinction within the
contract between a function similar to state law, which includes arbitra-
tion and standard contracting, and that of contracting within the state,
which would provide for the rights and duties of the parties.4 5 The effect
of this is that "[p]rivate arbitration and private legislation become the
core of a decision system, which begins to build up a hierarchy of norms
and of organizational bodies."'4 6
Teubner's approach provides greatly needed theoretical stability if one
is to move forward with the idea of the lex mercatoria as an autonomous
legal system as completely separate from the state. The circumstances
surrounding the lex mercatoria, however, do not mirror the closed circuit
model representing the "most perfect"4 7 de-paradoxification. With re-
spect to private arbitration and legislation, it is important to recognize
that neither of these currently exists through some sort of uniform inter-
national entity. Parties have the choice of selecting from a number of
private arbitration institutions, or even an ad hoc arbitrator, so the pros-










47. Id. at 16.
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pect of developing a uniform hierarchy of norms seems remote.48 Yet,
because arbitration decisions are more regularly published and codifica-
tions now exist that can explicitly be relied upon, it may be possible for
norms to be established to some degree. Some critics are skeptical of the
norm-creating power of arbitral tribunals, citing "the frequent emphasis
by arbitrators that equity and custom rather than law should govern their
decisions .... ",49 In addition, the fact that arbitration is tied to national
courts for recognition and appeal purposes breaks Teubner's closed cir-
cuit model because every exercise of this global law has the possibility of
being undermined by national courts;50 but this does not seem to insur-
mountably hamper the authority of the lex mercatoria as global law be-
cause national courts generally recognize arbitral awards. 51
2. The Lex Mercatoria and Its Relationship to State Law
In contrast to Teubner, Michaels does not see the lex mercatoria as law
"without a state,"'52 but instead as "law beyond.., the state."' 53 Although
he views the idea of law without a state as an important milestone in
overcoming the position "that all law is state law," 54 Michaels argues that
"[i]n perpetuating the state/non-state dichotomy, the lex mercatoria with-
out a state remains within a state-focused paradigm. '55 Placing focus on
the non-state, he argues, effectively makes the state the "prime criterion"
for differentiating between types of law.56
Michaels's view is that the lex mercatoria will never be an autonomous
law separate from the state (and nor should it be), even with the exten-
sive advancement of codification efforts, such as the UNIDROIT Princi-
ples.57 He notes that although arbitrators use the principles, they are
only "one of the many bodies of legal rules to which they look for gui-
dance."'58 He further argues that if the lex mercatoria really "were an
autonomous anational law, the use of state law would require some sort




See id. at 19-20.
Michaels, supra note 7, at 455-56.
See id. at 458 (His position is that arbitration fails to achieve the "legitimacy as-
signed to state courts and remains firmly interdependent with domestic courts").
See, e.g., Alec Stone Sweet, The New Lex Mercatoria & Transnational Governance,
13 J. EUR. Puji. Po 'y 627, 638 (2006) (stating that "the public policy and inarbi-
trability exceptions to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, con-
tained in the New York Convention and thus in most national statutes, are being
constructed narrowly by national courts and, in some countries like the United
States and France, have little practical relevance."); Leon E. Trakman, The
Twenty-First-Century Law Merchant, 48 AM. Bus. L. 775, 822 (2011).
Teubner, supra note 16, at 3.








Michaels, supra note 7, at 459.
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Michaels approaches the lex mercatoria from the perspective of com-
merce, saying that the debate is not about state/non-state, "but rather the
distinction between economy and politics"60-this is in the sense of politi-
cal law as constitutional and regulatory law, which are generally found
within the nation state.61 His main issue with the lex mercatoria "is
whether its structure, its internal differentiation, reflects that of the politi-
cal system or that of the economic system."' 62 To illustrate, the political
system is a "segmentary differentiation" because it consists of states, each
"of which must perform essentially the same functions."' 63 By contrast,
the economic system "represents a functional differentiation" because
the global economy is not based on boundaries between states, but is in-
stead differentiated through the existence of various economic sectors.64
A consideration of international trade indicates that boundaries between
states are often of little consequence. 65
Michaels is a proponent of this functional differentiation and believes it
is the way for the lex mercatoria to move forward 66 because it allows for
more creative thought to be developed around the lex mercatoria.67 How
this should translate into practice is unclear, but he does state that it
"should enable us truly to imagine law ... outside the state framework
altogether. '68 Unlike Teubner, Michaels is accepting of the idea that lex
mercatoria will never be independent from domestic law, citing that even
though there are codifications such as the UNIDROIT Principles, they do
not address all areas of the law (and nor should they, in his opinion); 69
the increased publication of arbitral awards does not constitute sufficient
precedent. Arbitration is not seen as having the same legitimacy as state
courts, which it is still dependent on. 70
Dalhuisen, like Michaels, does not see a lex mercatoria without the in-
volvement of domestic law. She argues that domestic law has a residual
role in completing the lex mercatoria and for providing a full system for
parties who seek to rely on it.7 1 For Dalhuisen, "domestic law is pre-
ceded by other transnationalized norms or sources of law [this includes
the lex mercatorial, and residually functions as transnational law itself in
the international commercial and financial legal order."'72 In contrast to
Michaels's approach, the employment of domestic law is elevated in char-
acter to that of the global lex mercatoria, but only insofar as lex mer-
60. Id. at 464.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 465.
64. Id.
65. Michaels, supra note 7, at 465.
66. Id. at 468.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 457.
70. Id. at 458.
71. JAN DALHUISEN, DALHUISEN ON TRANSNATIONAL COMPARATIVIE, COMMERCIAL,
FINANCIAL & TRADE LAW 322 (2010).
72. Id.
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catoria permits-this is almost the inverse of Lowenfeld's view. Instead
of domestic law being supplemented by the lex mercatoria, the lex mer-
catoria is supplemented by domestic law.
Dalhuisen also argues that "state courts operating in international
cases should be seen as agents of the international and financial legal
order, therefore as international commercial courts. ' 73 Her approach
somewhat addresses the issue that if the lex mercatoria were a global law
without a state, it would still be subordinate to national law, but it could
potentially be a challenge for a national court acting as an international
commercial court to separate itself from its national roots. Dalhuisen fur-
ther argues that there should be a central highest international appeal
court to guide the development of the lex mercatoria that would be lim-
ited to giving preliminary opinions on points of transnational law or pub-
lic policy, but only when asked to do so.74 This is an innovative notion,
and one that may be viewed especially by Teubner with approval, as it
would be a step toward the idea of a global judicial body.
The above discussion details recent theories that endeavour to concep-
tualize the lex mercatoria within a legal order; even after decades of de-
bate, legal theorists have yet come to a consensus. In terms of providing
a stable foundation for a completely autonomous lex mercatoria, if it were
achievable, Teubner's approach appears to have the potential for a legal
order that would be viewed as on par and not subordinate to state law;
however, as mentioned, this reality seems not to be in the near future. It
seems that for now the state and the lex mercatoria are inseparable, and
the views of Michaels and Dalhuisen that recognize this participation are
likely the most realistic. Michaels's approach seems to be the most in line
with the nature of international commercial contract; however, it may be
a challenge to conceive of the lex mercatoria outside of the state/non-state
dichotomy, given that this dichotomy is the common paradigm through
which lawyers, arbitrators, and academics view the law (as evidenced in
Part III).
Commercial contracting parties are not only concerned with how the
lex mercatoria is approached from a foundational theoretical standpoint,
but they are also concerned about the actual substantive content of the
lex mercatoria and its usefulness and viability in commercial contract.
This issue has recently been addressed through the codification of princi-
ples of the lex mercatoria, although there is disagreement as to whether
codification is the best way to advance the lex mercatoria.
73. Id. at 324.
74. Id.
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III. CODIFICATION OF THE LEX MERCATORIA: STATUS,
CONTENT, AND CONTROVERSY
A. INTRODUCTION TO CODIFICATION
Codification, a marker of the era of the new lex mercatoria, indicates a
shift from the lex mercatoria's customary roots as distinct from state law,
to the lex mercatoria as similar to state law.75 Current codifications now
go beyond Mustill's list of twenty principles. The UNIDROIT Principles
and the Trans-Lex Principles, for example, are detailed rules with a ca-
pacity to function like state legislation as complete codifications of the lex
mercatoria.76 The state-like character is enhanced by the now more fre-
quent publication of arbitral awards, which allows some degree of prece-
dent.77 Other examples of codification of the lex mercatoria include
Incoterms, the ICC's Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary
Credits (UCP 600), the 1906 British Marine Insurance Act, the Cornell
Common Core Project, the Lando Commission Principles of European
Contract Law, and the Trans-Lex Principles. 78 The recent movement to
codify the lex mercatoria appears, as might be expected, to be primarily
driven by scholars from civil law jurisdictions, particularly in Europe.79
But codification, which makes the lex mercatoria appear similar to state
law, should not necessarily be assumed to be without adverse implica-
tions. The following subsections examine whether the codification of the
lex mercatoria is an advantage or a detriment to its application and future
development.
B. APPROACHES TO CODIFICATION: UNIDROIT AND THE TRANS-
LEX PRINCIPLES
For the purpose of illustration, this section will focus on the
UNIDROIT and Trans-Lex Principles to discuss different approaches to
codification. This author has selected these two approaches because they
are predominant and extensive codifications that are often referred to in
the debate over the lex mercatoria.80 There are two key differences be-
tween the two sets of principles. First, the UNIDROIT Principles are
limited to international commercial contract law, while the Trans-Lex
Principles go beyond this to also include any principle that may be in-
75. Michaels, supra note 7, at 456.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See Berman & Dasser, supra note 5, at 28; Moses, supra note 10, at 65-66; Herman,
supra note, 2 at 6; Fassberg, supra note 11, at 69; Fortier, supra note 7, at 124;
Klaus Peter Berger, Codification of the New Lex Mercatoria Through the Internet:
The TransLex Principles at www.trans-lex.org, in NEW DIRECHIONS IN INTERNA-
TIONAi ECONOMIC LAW 79 (Todd Weiler & Freya Baetens, eds. 2011).
79. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PIERz-PEROMO, THE CIvIt. LAw TRIDr-
TION 31 (3d ed. 2007); see generally William Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions: Common
Law vs Civil Law (Codified and Uncodified), 60 LA. L. REv. 678 (2000), available
at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisgtbiblio/tetley.html.
80. This is as discovered by the author's research. The author did not research non-
English language sources.
FRIEND OR FOE?
volved in an international business dispute. 81 Second, the UNIDROIT
Principles are developed to reflect "concepts to be found in many, if not
all, legal systems" and are updated by the publication of periodic restate-
ments,82 while the Trans-Lex Principles are developed through the tech-
nique of creeping codification, which continually compiles rules and
principles of the lex mercatoria that "have been accepted in international
arbitral and contract practice. ' '83
The Trans-Lex Principles, initiated by Berger and operated by the
Center for Transnational Law (CENTRAL), were first published as a list
of thirty-nine principles in 1992,84 and by 1999 had grown to seventy-eight
principles. 85 In October 2009, the list had further expanded to 128 princi-
ples; 86 currently, it contains 132 principles. 87 UNIDROIT has published
three editions of its principles: the first, published in 1994, contained 120
articles; the second, published in 2004, contained 185 articles; and the
third and most recent edition, published in 2010, consists of 211 articles.88
While both the UNIDROIT and Trans-Lex principles are available on-
line, the UNIDROIT Principles are found in a static PDF format,
whereas the Trans-Lex Principles take the form of a database that enables
the updating of one portion without having to "re-publish" the whole
document.89 The Trans-Lex Principles contain references for each princi-
ple that include "doctrine" (i.e., academic literature), "arbitral awards,"
"court decisions," "national legislation," "principles" (e.g., UNIDROIT),
"international legislation," "model laws," and "model terms." 90 The
UNIDROIT Principles, in contrast, take the format of stating each article
followed by a "comment" section that provides further explanation (and
sometimes fact-based illustrations) for application of the rule.
C. LEX MERCATORIA: CODIFICATION AND CERTAINTY
A positive effect of codification appears to be increased legitimacy of
the lex mercatoria because it creates a set of rules that can be more or less
uniformly followed on a global basis, helping to address concerns of
vagueness and uncertainty.91 The certainty and utility provided by codifi-
cation have the potential to provide a sufficient framework for arbitrators
to render a decision without having to make difficult conflicts-of-law
81. Berger, supra note 79, at 104.
82. See UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 13, at xxiii.
83. Berger, supra note 79, at 82.
84. Id. at 99.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 103.
87. Trans-Lex Principles, supra note 14.
88. See UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 13, at vii (UNIDROIT refers to its individ-
ual rules/principles as "articles").
89. For more information on the Trans-Lex database, see Berger, supra note 79, at
101-03; see also UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 13.
90. See, e.g., No. 1.1.1-Good Faith and Fair Dealing in International Trade, TRANS-
Li~x, http://www.trans-lex.org/901000#toc-1 (last visited Oct. 21, 2014).
91. See, e.g., JOACHIM G. FRICK, ARIBI'ITRATION AND COMPLEX INTERNATIONAL CON-
TRACYS 96 (2001); Moses, supra note 10, at 64.
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choices between domestic states.92 Alternatively, it is possible that the
codified lex mercatoria could be incorporated into the conflicts-of-law
doctrine as an alternative to domestic choice of law.93
Berger argues that the incorporation of the codified lex mercatoria into
the conflicts of law doctrine would ensure that arbitration decisions based
on lex mercatoria would not be set aside by courts.94 It has also been
argued that courts may be less likely to set aside an arbitration decision
when it is based on codified lex mercatoria principles because as the use
of the principles increases, courts will develop familiarity with its con-
tents.9 5 But as mentioned, given that courts generally uphold arbitration
decisions without examining the merits in close detail, the utility of these
arguments in the context of the recognition of arbitral decisions is
questionable.
On the other hand, in the arbitration context, codification of the lex
mercatoria may have a real and direct effect on how and if the lex mer-
catoria is to be utilized and relied upon. Frick argues that a lack of clearly
defined rules "creates uncertainty in arbitral decision making," resulting
in parties being "unable to predict confidently the legality of their action
before arbitration. ' 96 But not all critics take this view, noting that skilled
courts or arbitrators may be able to adjust rules or facts to achieve a
desired result. And since identifiable principles of the lex mercatoria can
be found in its common usage or customary form, codification does not
provide additional certainty or foreseeability of outcome. 97
1. Certainty and the UNIDROIT and Trans-Lex Principles
From the standpoint of practitioners, the idea that the lex mercatoria
should not be codified may be a cause for concern because the customary
approach to the lex mercatoria has been said to struggle "both in its 'prov-
ability,' and in finding a comprehensive set of principles. ' 98 While codifi-
cation may be viewed as transforming the lex mercatoria from a flexible
and agile legal doctrine to a more rigid one (perhaps contrary to its true
nature, as discussed below), current codification initiatives have been
seen as informal and pragmatic. 99
This fear of rigidity can perhaps be alleviated to some degree when
considering the UNIDROIT Principles because restatements appear to
be published when needed in accordance with the evolution of the lex
mercatoria. But this fear may be further reduced by the employment of
92. Stone Sweet, supra note 52, at 632, 634. Sweet also notes, "In the past two de-
cades, a substantial literature has appeared showing that existing conflict-of-laws
techniques lead to wholly unpredictable decisions." Id. at 632.
93. Berger, supra note 79, at 90.
94. Id.
95. Stone Sweet, supra note 52, at 634.
96. FrICK, supra note 92, at 96.
97. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Remaking of Arbitration: Design and Destiny, in
Lr-x MERCATORIA ANn) ARBITRATION, 1, 13 (Thomas E. Carbonneau, ed., 1990).
98. Fortier, supra note 7, at 122.
99. Id. at 124.
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the creeping codification technique of the Trans-Lex Principles, where
principles are updated on the Trans-Lex website as they emerge in prac-
tice. 1° ° Codifications such as these can assist in addressing the needs of
practitioners by providing a stable and reliable list of rules. 10 1
Fortier argues that "the most important attribute of these collections is
that they exist" because this enables them to be easily referred to by par-
ties, the court, or an arbitrator. 02 He takes the position that the lex mer-
catoria needs fixing, that its uncodified form is sub-par, and that by
"tackling" the lex mercatoria through codification, it is finally being
"wrestl[ed] . . . into usable shape.' 0 3 Although codification may assist
the application of the lex mercatoria by providing more concrete rules for
arbitrators and lawyers to cite to and rely on, not all commentators agree
that codification is necessarily a positive step in its development.
D. THE TRUE NATURE OF THE LEX MERCATORIA MAY BE
UNDERMINED BY CODIFICATION
Certainty is not the only criteria for assessing the value of the codified
lex mercatoria. Its role as different from state law is also important; un-
like the law of a state, the lex mercatoria does not compete for sover-
eignty, so if it claims to be similar, it may suffer a "competitive
disadvantage. '1 0 4 The transformation of the lex mercatoria through codi-
fication into a form that resembles state law may present a greater risk
for the lex mercatoria than for the state because it may lose "whatever
functional advantages it has had over state-based law."' 0 5
Fassberg agrees with the notion that codification of the lex mercatoria
legitimizes it as a system of recognized norms and enhances its auton-
omy.10 6 But she thinks that this may come at a price because courts and
arbitrators may "refrain from using these codifications as reservoirs of
rules unless they are persuaded independently that they constitute mer-
cantile or trade custom" and only use them if they are contractually in-
corporated. 10 7 Instead, she argues that "[i]nformal custom has a far
greater chance of being implemented as a means of interpreting and com-
pleting contractual obligations" than the codifications.' 08
Codification can also be seen as contrary to the nature of the lex mer-
catoria's customary mercantile roots.10 9 This is illustrated by the fact that
the codifications are formulated by lawyers based on national rules, uni-
form laws, and international principles (which are also formulated by law-
100. Berger, supra note 79, at 101.
101. Fortier, supra note 7, at 125.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 127.
104. Michaels, supra note 7, at 462.
105. Id.
106. Fassberg, supra note 11, at 78.
107. Id. at 78-79.
108. Id. at 79.
109. See id. at 80.
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yers) through legal comparison, and not all of the rules are supported by
references to arbitral awards-which would seem to be necessary evi-
dence that the rules did indeed arise from commercial practice. 110 The
Trans-Lex Principles, however, do provide references to arbitral awards
for each rule, while the UNIDROIT Principles do not." j' Thus, the
Trans-Lex Principles may be seen to better encompass commercial prac-
tices than the UNIDROIT Principles. But determining whether an arbi-
tral decision was made because it indeed reflects commercial practice can
be unclear, and thus is still problematic.
Codification, therefore, may present a struggle between what is evi-
dence of commercial practice and what should be commercial practice.' 12
There is a concern that the drive to codify the lex mercatoria to assert its
autonomy will then push for the creation of explicit rules of lex mer-
catoria that may not be genuine commercial practice. 113 Then, codifica-
tion may affect the opposite of that which it sought to achieve; the
autonomy of the lex mercatoria may become compromised because, in
the words of Fassberg, "The more formal and explicit the rules, the less
organic, the less spontaneous, the less authentic they are."
14
The codification of the lex mercatoria may also negatively affect party
autonomy. If the parties to a contract provide for arbitration and the
application of the lex mercatoria, their original intent may be for the arbi-
tral tribunal to apply general notions of order and fairness associated with
the lex mercatoria."5 But if the application of the lex mercatoria becomes
synonymous with a more rigid codified regime, the parties' intentions,
and thus their individual autonomy (and, by implication, the true nature
of the lex mercatoria) may be compromised."16
E. CODIFICATION MAY ALLOW POLITICIZATION OF THE
LEx MERCATORIA
Codification also raises the concern of politicization of the lex mer-
catoria because of who decides which principles are included in a codified
version of the lex mercatoria and which ones are not." 7 In light of the lex
mercatoria originally being derived from merchant practice, Okwor asks a
question of the UNIDROIT Principles in particular: "[h]ow [can] an or-
ganisation which is self-professedly intergovernmental produce a docu-
ment which is considered [authentic] evidence of the lex mercatoria?""8
This may be answered by the fact that the UNIDROIT Principles, as well
as other codifications such as the Trans-Lex Principles, purport to codify
110. Id. at 80-81.
111. See Trans-Lex Principles, supra note 14; UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 13;
Fassberg, supra note 11, at 80-81.
112. See Fassberg, supra note 11, at 80-81.
113. See id. at 82.
114. Id.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 79.
117. See, e.g., id. at 80-81.
118. Okwor, supra note 1, at 397.
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already existing rules of the lex mercatoria, and neither codification is di-
rected by any national government. 19
Although this goes to mitigate the politicization of the lex mercatoria,
politicization does not necessarily need to be caused by any specific do-
mestic state. It can occur through the non-representation of some
merchant practices and usages in the codification of the lex mercatoria.
This would have the effect of forcing some parties to follow the lex mer-
catoria as set out by other mercantile communities whose "rules" are
codified. 120
Surprisingly, instead of taking Fassberg's approach against codification,
Okwor argues that codification is necessary for the lex mercatoria to be a
"coherent system."'12 1 But to remedy the problem of some merchant
practices being represented in the codifications, while others are not, she
says that "representation has to be made of merchants in developing soci-
eties and their lex mercatoria."'22 This concern can be illustrated by
Stone Sweet, who notes that the drafters of the UNIDROIT Principles
"focused primarily on the identification and codification of general prin-
ciples of contract law, principles which they could claim were common to
developed, or 'mature,' national systems of law.' 1 23
It also seems that Dalhuisen's hierarchy of lex mercatoria (as discussed
in Part II) could potentially increase the risk of the lex mercatoria being
influenced by politicized sources because of domestic law's residual
role. 124 Domestic law "residually function[ing] as transnational law"
could potentially be improperly incorporated (because it may not re-
present commercial custom) into the lex mercatoria in codified form by
UNIDROIT or CENTRAL. 25 Codification, which has the effect of
making a rule "official," may present a barrier to having this kind of ele-
vated domestic law "removed" from the lex mercatoria once it has been
codified.
The lex mercatoria "provides arbitrators with tools of construction, ' 126
which may be amplified, especially with respect to the Trans-Lex Princi-
ples because the principles are updated regularly and are largely based on
arbitral decisions. Therefore, the avenue from arbitral decision to codi-
fied lex mercatoria may become a direct route for the codified lex mer-
catoria to be injected with laws of a domestic legal system (or other laws
or principles) that do not reflect commercial custom without sufficient
scrutiny as to whether they do indeed constitute such custom. As a result,
it is important that UNIDROIT and CENTRAL pay careful attention to
119. See id.; Center for Transnational Law, UNIVIERsrrAT zu KOLN, http://www.central.
uni-koeln.de/0/content/13 (last visited Apr. 2, 2014); UNIDROIT Principles, supra
note 13.
120. Okwor, supra note 1, at 401.
121. See id. at 402.
122. Id.
123. Stone Sweet, supra note 52, at 634 (emphasis added).
124. See DALItUISEN, supra note 71, at 322.
125. Id.
126. Liukkunen, supra note 15, at 215.
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the rules that they choose to include in their codifications to ensure that
unwarranted politicization is not incorporated into the lex mercatoria.
1. Codification May Restrict Development of Lex Mercatoria
There is also another inquiry, which would be difficult to prove empiri-
cally: does codification restrict the development of the lex mercatoria?
Although the codifications purport to be evidence of the lex mer-
catoria,127 if they become synonymous with it, development could be re-
stricted. If codification begins to create an environment whereby
principles that are not already included are rejected, the lex mercatoria
could cease to further develop.
While this has not been shown to be the case, it is something that is
important for codification bodies, such as CENTRAL and UNIDROIT,
to be aware of.128 It is also an issue that should be brought to the atten-
tion of arbitrators, who should not be quick to reject potentially novel
practices without adequate consideration, especially practices involving
parties from developing or newly developed nations and unfamiliar eco-
nomic sectors.
IV. CONCLUSION
The debate over where the lex mercatoria best fits in terms of a legal
order has yet to be resolved. But this is not indicative of its lack of exis-
tence, only merely of the need to find a suitable framework for it that can
be reconciled with today's legal climate. Codification makes the lex mer-
catoria appear similar to state law, and so seems to naturally fit within a
legal order, such as Teubner's, with the lex mercatoria as a national law
functioning in a similar framework to the state, but on a global level. But,
while this conception of the lex mercatoria may seem the most natural, as
mentioned, this reality is far away. Conversely, the lex mercatoria's true
nature as customary mercantile law should not be forgotten. An approach
that is more in line with global economic processes, such as Michaels's,
may be more successful in allowing the lex mercatoria to maintain its flex-
ibility and un-state-like qualities.
Codification, while it may bring prominence and clarity to the lex mer-
catoria, should be approached with caution. Organizations responsible
for codification, such as CENTRAL and UNIDROIT, should take care to
ensure that codifications represent commercial practices as they evolve
both in new economic sectors and developing nations. Care should also
be taken to avoid incorporating domestic (and other) law into codifica-
tions of the lex mercatoria, unless it indeed does represent commercial
custom. While the UNIDROIT and Trans-Lex Principles take different
approaches, if the foregoing is kept in mind, then it seems that codifica-
tion may have the potential to be the lex mercatoria's friend and not its
foe.
127. See Okwor, supra note 1, at 400-01.
128. This author did not find any evidence of this through her research.
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